





<T>Democracy, Compromise and the Representation Paradox: Coalition Government 
and Political Integrity</t> 
 
<BI>The British general election of May 2010 failed to deliver any party a parliamentary 
majority. Consequently, no single party could form a government without a degree of support 
from one or more other parties.
2
 Two options were potentially possible: either one of the two 
largest parties – the Conservatives or, less plausibly, Labour – could form a minority 
government with sufficient passive support from other parties to get their budget approved, or 
one or other of them could enter into a coalition with one or more other parties. The former 
option, of a ‘confidence and supply agreement’, suggests minimal concessions. Such deals 
imply that the other parties need only support those policies they agree with or have no 
reason to disagree with. However, that condition may constrain the government so much as to 
force it into inaction and so has generally proved unstable and short lived. By contrast, the 
latter option of a coalition promises greater stability because those involved become partners 
in government and must settle on a joint programme.
3
 However, it thereby requires all sides 
to compromise and concede something to the others. Not only must favoured policies that are 
unacceptable to the coalition partners be jettisoned, moved down the list of priorities or 
watered down, but also it is likely that all partners will have to accept and actively promote 
some measures they believe misguided or even wrong. Potentially, this circumstance puts in 
question the political integrity of the politicians involved. The suggestion arises that to attain 
office they have betrayed themselves and their parties by abandoning both their own 
principles and their undertakings to their voters. Indeed, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat 
Coalition that emerged after the election has attracted precisely this criticism, with supporters 
of both parties alleging that in compromising with each other the politicians have 
compromised themselves and their electors. Both parties stand accused of abandoning 
specific pledges, on immigration and inheritance tax (in the case of the Conservatives) and on 
student fees (in the case of the Liberal Democrats) and of diluting their distinctive ideologies 
in the process. 
My aim is not to explore the rights and wrongs of this episode per se, but rather to use it to 
illustrate the nature of political compromise. Though not unknown,
4
 minority governments 
and coalitions are less common in Britain – at least in national elections – than in most other 
democratic systems, where they are the norm rather than the exception. However, in the spirit 
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of Charles Dickens’s Mr Podsnap, coalitions have generally been regarded by British  
political commentators as a feature of ‘other countries’ sadly obliged by their more 
proportional electoral systems to ‘do . . . as they do’.5 This conventional Podsnappery holds 
coalition government to be defective precisely because it entails compromises that are 
thought to be inherently unprincipled and undemocratic, for it is assumed that they 
necessarily involve breaking electoral commitments.
6
 The possibility for ‘uncompromising’ 
politics provided by the British plurality voting system is deemed an advantage rather than a 
defect, therefore: one of the ways ‘this Island was Blest . . . to the Direct Exclusion of such 
Other Countries . . . as there may happen to be’.7 In what follows, I shall challenge that view 
by defending the sorts of compromise that coalition government entails as both principled 
and democratic.  
Compromise is an ambiguous term, and evokes positive as well as negative 
connotations. Deployed negatively, as in the standard criticism of coalitions, it conjures a 
picture of democratic politics and politicians more generally as unprincipled and 
untrustworthy. From this perspective, to compromise is to compromise oneself by falling 
short of one’s professed standards.8 Politicians compromise because they are prepared to do 
anything to enjoy the perquisites of office. Deployed positively, however, it describes an 
admirable willingness to include and respect the concerns of others.
 
From this perspective, to 
compromise is to hear (and hearken to) the other side.
9
 Compromise may even render a 
policy both better and more democratic by benefitting from, and appealing to, a broader range 
of perspectives from within the political community.
10
 
On the negative account, any post-electoral compromise entails going back on the 
pledges politicians made to the voters, in order to do a deal with those whom they had 
hitherto opposed. As a result, its democratic credentials seem poor. Compromise appears 
most coherent and acceptable the more minimal and instrumental it is.
 
To retain their political 
integrity, therefore, politicians should only make pragmatic concessions to achieve as much 
of their programme as possible.
11
 In particular, the ends and principles that motivate a given 
political vision – such as their view of the rights and obligations of individuals towards 
society at large – should be kept out of politics so far as they can. They provide side 
constraints on any compromise, for a compromise is morally acceptable to the extent these 
ends are not themselves compromised. By contrast, on the positive account, compromise 
cannot be entirely pragmatic. There must be some appreciation of the moral vision of those 
with whom one compromises for any agreement to be possible. As a result, compromise has 
to be moral in both substantive and procedural terms. Certain complementarities between 
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core moral commitments must be found as a basis for the compromise, and the means of 
doing so must be motivated by an acceptance of the legitimacy of disagreement.  
The positive as well as the negative view has been evident in assessments of the 
Coalition.
12
 Although the two Coalition party leaders tend to employ the negative view when 
talking to their own supporters, they resort to the positive view when appealing to each other. 
In the first case, they suggest that compromise is a regrettable necessity but has been kept to a 
minimum.
13
 In the second case, they argue that compromise has offered an opportunity to 
combine the best of both parties’ visions. 14 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have 
related the negative and positive views of compromise to the campaigning and governing 
mindsets, and there is a degree of truth in that observation.
15
 However, I wish to argue that 
even in a campaign the positive view is the more coherent and democratic of the two. The 
negative view only proves tenable in a limited, and increasingly unusual, set of 
circumstances. 
In terms of my somewhat stylized depiction of the options following the 2010 UK 
election, it might appear that the negative view of compromise coincides more with ‘the 
confidence and supply agreement’ and the positive account more with the eventual Coalition. 
To some extent, that impression proves well-founded. As I shall attempt to show below, the 
Coalition agreement probably would not have been possible without at least some elements 
of the positive view being adopted by the actors involved. However, it is not my intention to 
defend Coalition government as morally superior to majority or minority government, let 
alone to suggest that this Coalition provided the best possible outcome for the 2010 election. I 
simply wish to defend the positive view as the most normatively appealing way to tackle the 
compromises that most people accept form an inevitable part of political life. After all, even a 
party enjoying a parliamentary majority may need to compromise with certain factions on its 
own side to get particularly contentious measures through. Yet the negative view will always 
regard such compromises as regrettable and slightly dirty. By contrast, the positive view will 
treat them as part and parcel of a pluralist and democratic society, in which disagreement and 
diversity are facts of life. I do not deny that parties can be divided in ways that make the 
positive approach impossible and that there are dirty and even rotten compromises.
16
 
Nevertheless, pace the negative view, I shall argue that compromises are more likely to prove 
unsatisfactory and unsavoury the more they are tackled from the negative as opposed to the 
positive perspective. 
The central claim is that the negative view of compromise rests on a misconception of 
the democratic process. It latches on to certain apparent paradoxes in the notion of 
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compromising that reflect those posed by democratic theory more generally, and within 
representative democracy in particular. However, the negative view’s favoured approach – of 
minimal compromise – actually compounds rather than resolves these dilemmas. At the heart 
of the problem lies what I shall call the ‘representation paradox’, which parallels the paradox 
in the theory of democracy noted many years ago by Richard Wollheim.
17
 Wollheim’s 
paradox consisted of the dilemma of a committed democrat who believes A ought to be done 
when the democratic majority holds that B ought to be done, and thereby finds him or herself 
believing that both A and B ought to be done, even if A and B are incompatible with each 
other.
18
 The representation paradox develops this point further and has two aspects: the first 
on the side of the represented, the second on that of the representative.
19
 With regard to the 
represented, compromise suggests that voters are potentially not simply caught between being 
committed to the view they may have voted for, on the one hand, and the process of 
democratic voting, on the other, as Wollheim observed. They are also caught between the 
views that the representative they voted for pledged to uphold on their behalf and the views 
he or she actually puts into practice. As a result, the represented may feel that their vote truly 
counts for nothing. Meanwhile, representatives can find themselves having been elected to do 
one thing – and presumably believing that policy to be the right one – yet having to do 
something else. In each case, the fact of compromise arguably compromises the integrity of 
both the agents involved – the citizen in one case and the politician in the other.  
I shall set about dissolving this paradox as follows. In the first section I criticize the 
paradoxical position implied by the negative view whereby compromises are more likely to 
be principled if they are pragmatically motivated and moral principles and ends are excluded 
as far as possible from the compromise. According to this line of thinking, to compromise on 
moral grounds risks being incoherent, suggesting one should think it right to do what one 
believes to be wrong, while a compromise of moral ends and principles risks being either 
unprincipled or implies moral correction – that both sides have modified their views because 
they have come closer to a consensus on what is morally fairer or more just for them to do, in 
which case neither is compromising at all.
20
 Against this position, I distinguish a ‘shallow’ 
compromise based on trading and bartering from a ‘deep’ compromise that has the mutual 
modification of ends and principles at its core. The first type of compromise can be purely 
pragmatic and instrumental, but it proves difficult for the second type to be so without 
involving some moral acceptance of the legitimacy of the different views involved in the 
disagreement. However, such acceptance need not signal incoherence, a lack of principle or 
moral correction, merely that both parties find reasons within their own moral views for 
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conceding something to each other. While certain avoidance strategies of what I call 
‘trimming’ and ‘segregation’ may be needed to protect those areas where no compromise is 
available, most political compromise cannot but involve the ends and principles of those 
involved and have them at its core. For they define the contours of the policies we favour and 
the ways they might be traded or bartered. As a result, compromise will often need to be 
moral rather than purely pragmatic in both substance and process, since it will rest on a 
degree of reciprocity and mutual recognition between the parties concerned. 
The second section then turns to the way in which accepting the authority of 
democratic decision-making itself implies such a moral acceptance of the need for 
compromise. Indeed, that very moral acceptance lies behind the standard solution to the 
Wollheim paradox. Democracy involves accepting disagreement and distinguishing one’s 
own view as a contribution to that disagreement from the democratic outcome as a resolution 
of that disagreement. One way of characterizing this acceptance is to see democracy as a 
means for promoting a fair compromise which accords equal respect and concern to different 
views without assuming any consensus between them. The democratic process arranges 
compromises between people who all believe that they are entitled to live by their own 
conception of the good but need to reach some collective agreements to do so. The 
aggregative aspect of democracy suggests that it does this in a purely mechanical way, but 
democracy also has its deliberative phase. As such, it builds on deep as well as shallow 
compromise in order to forge the coalitions needed to win elections, even in a plurality 
system. 
The third section then argues that compromise between representatives becomes more 
rather than less legitimate the deeper it goes. The representation paradox derives from a 
delegatory model of representation, which gets caught on the horns of Wollheim’s dilemma 
and allows at best for the shallowest of compromises. On this account, representatives are 
tied to specific policy commitments to which they should stick as far as possible. The 
assumption is that deep compromise only proves possible on the trustee model that divorces 
the compromises of representatives from those of the voters, and enjoys the most indirect 
democratic legitimacy. However, if elections are viewed as being about principles and not 
just policies, then representatives may legitimately engage in a deep compromise on the 
electorate’s behalf, to the extent that their political reasoning reflects the principled 
arguments of the voters. This argument rests on a quasi-pictorial view of representation in 
which the representative body roughly mirrors the reasoning on political issues found within 
the electorate. Given, as I argue in the first section, that keeping faith with principles allows 
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for more flexibility in compromising than a commitment to policies does, while – as I show 
in the second section –  an adherence to democracy itself mandates a willingness to 
compromise, then representatives can legitimately enter deep compromises for their 
supporters so long as they reason as them. The result is that coalitions and compromise can 
be regarded not simply (and negatively) as normal for democratic politics; they constitute a 
(positive) democratic norm.</bi> 
<H1>THE NATURE OF COMPROMISE: SHALLOW AND DEEP </h1> 
<BNI>According to the standard definition, compromise involves disagreement between two 
or more people who need to make a collective decision, in which all parties settle for less 
than they believe they are entitled to.
21
 So conceived, compromise differs from both a 
coerced agreement and a consensus. It differs from a coerced agreement in being voluntary. It 
may be occasioned by the force of circumstances making it impossible for politicians to act 
without cooperating with others holding different and conflicting views to theirs, but it is 
assumed that they always have alternatives or could choose not to act at all. As we saw in the 
case of the 2010 UK election, a Conservative-led Coalition was not the only option, and fresh 
elections might have been called. Yet, though consented to, the result does not reflect a 
consensus because it involves all sides accepting a settlement that falls short of what they 
regard as right or good in ways they may feel misguided and even wrong. Consequently, any 
compromise involves all concerned choosing to some degree to hold their noses and to do 
certain things they would rather not have done in order to get a collective agreement. 
Compromises are interpersonal but also intrapersonal; to compromise with others one must 
also compromise with oneself.
22
</bni> 
<BI>Though all compromises share these features, they can take different forms that 
reflect different motivations. Here too at least one common feature appears necessary. As van 
Parijs notes,
23
 the condition for any compromise is Pareto optimality – each party must feel 
the compromise is an improvement on the status quo. It would be hard to imagine them 
compromising otherwise. Yet, that may suggest that compromise consists solely of 
pragmatic, minimal concessions. For example, a compromise on a coalition is acceptable to 
the extent that the parties regard implementing some of their programme as better than 
implementing none of it and letting another group implement theirs. I shall characterize 
political compromises of this type as ‘shallow’ and contrast them with ‘deep’ compromises of 
a more principled kind.
24
 In the first type, compromise is instrumental and restricted as far as 
possible to policy issues, in the second type compromise is moral and involves a degree of 
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mutual respect for, and accommodation of, the different principles and ends of the parties 
involved. 
‘Shallow’ compromises involve a trade-off. The simplest trade-off is to ‘split the 
difference’. If a buyer is bargaining with a trader in the market over the price of a hat, he may 
prefer paying £10 to £20, and the trader may prefer that he pay £20 rather than £10. However, 
so long as the buyer feels paying £15 is better than having no hat, and the trader sees £15 as 
better than making no sale, they can compromise simply by splitting the difference.
25
 Such 
compromises are instrumental. The preferences of buyer and trader are largely fixed and 
unaffected by the bargaining. The aim is simply to coordinate the buyer’s desire for a good 
hat at a low price, with the trader’s desire to sell his hats at the highest price possible. Such 
deals reflect the relative bargaining power of the parties concerned and allow for the rich 
tourist buyer to exploit the poor local trader. If the trader’s need to sell is greater than the 
buyer’s need for a hat, that may mean that the concession is not equitable – they might settle 
at £13, all but wiping out the trader’s profit. Such trading need not be substantively moral, 
therefore. It also need not involve the discussion of moral notions in the process. Trading 
assumes a common currency that allows these compromises to be resolved along one 
dimension. The various parties may hold conflicting positions about, say, the exploitation of 
developing countries by the developed world. But they need not discuss them openly, or if 
they do so need not accommodate the views of the other to compromise. The trader may say 
(or think), ‘What about my starving wife and kids?’, and the buyer say (or think), ‘You 
should try selling hats at £13 rather than at £20 – you would do more business.’ Within the 
transaction, though, their different positions are commensurable – each simply has his price.  
However, political compromises are invariably multi-dimensional and involve 
different and possibly incommensurable currencies. After all, the idea of politicians being 
bought practically defines an ‘unprincipled’ compromise. It might, though, still be possible to 
barter. In a barter the parties share no common currency, monetary or otherwise. Suppose 
Jane barters three apples for John’s two pears. They may value them for quite different 
reasons – Jane does not eat fruit but appreciates their decorative qualities and prefers the 
shape of John’s pears to that of her apples, John likes eating fruit and fancies a change from 
pears. Yet, even if Jane regards one of her apples as equivalent to one of John’s pears 
whereas John thinks his pears are worth two of her apples, the compromise is possible 
because each wants what the other has enough to make concessions. Likewise, a political 
compromise may be possible if certain of each group’s most favoured policies are ones that 
the other groups feel less strongly about. In such cases, they too may be able to barter, 
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including in their common programme, say, the housing policy favoured by one group and 
the school policy favoured by another. Log-rolling classically takes this form. Note, though, 
that, like trading, bartering is instrumental and can be both immoral and amoral. The parties 
need not attempt to understand each other, nor need the deal be particularly fair – one party 
may be at a considerable advantage to the other and use that advantage to get more than the 
other does, whether they deserve to do so or not. All the parties need do is to discover a point 
that will satisfy their exogenously defined preferences sufficiently for each to feel a deal is 
better than no deal. 
However, people tend to support given policies not simply as matters of ‘pure’ 
preference – be it mere taste or self-interest - but also for normative reasons. If the reasons 
one group have for prioritizing housing over schools are different and in conflict with the 
reasons the other group have for prioritizing schools over housing, then even a barter will not 
be available. For the reason for a group supporting housing may equally be a reason for their 
not supporting schools and vice versa. In these cases, moral principles and ends may block 
both trading and barter. Edmund Burke may have believed that ‘all government . . . is 
founded on compromise and barter,’ yet remarked ‘none will barter away the immediate 
jewel of his soul.’26 In this case, a shallow instrumental compromise will be impossible 
without it turning into a morally reprehensible compromise of the kind only the most 
unprincipled would enter into – those who, in Oscar Wilde’s definition of a cynic, ‘know the 
price of everything and the value of nothing’.27 
A ‘deep’ compromise may be possible, though. Deep compromises involve reasoning 
about principles as well as policies. Individual preferences are not taken as fixed and 
exogenous, with the aim being to maximize their satisfaction. Rather, our preferences reflect 
reasons that can be modified to accommodate the reasons of others through the process of 
debating and negotiating with them. Indeed, it is only through mutual modifications at the 
level of principle that a joint policy position can be built. Say the reasons that Party A has for 
prioritizing a certain policy towards schools is a theory about equality of opportunity that 
leads its proponents to be opposed to most forms of welfare redistribution, while Party B sees 
housing as a priority precisely because it hold that more welfare-friendly view of equality. In 
this situation, any attempt to combine their policies will require that they also to some degree 
combine their respective reasoning about them too. Such a combination can be some way 
short of a consensus. Each, though, may be moved to find ways to accommodate some of the 
reasons of the other side that are congruent with their own reasoning. For example, Party B 
may not have seen scholarships to private schools as the best way of improving the 
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educational prospects for poorer sections of society, but nonetheless acknowledge that there 
is a meritocratic strand to their own line of reasoning that can accommodate such a policy. 
Likewise, Party A may regard certain forms of social housing as akin to a ‘scholarship’ – a 
step on the housing ladder for deserving, hard-working families – and approve increased 
spending in this area on that basis. In these cases, compromise becomes possible because 
neither side is simply adopting an instrumental and pragmatic approach. Each is attempting to 
appreciate to some degree the moral reasoning of the other side by relating it to similar 
reasoning of their own. There is a core of substantive mutual moral appreciation at the heart 
of the compromise that nonetheless falls short of mutual moral correction or consensus. 
‘Shallow’ compromises have elements in common with what Rawls calls a ‘modus 
vivendi’, while a ‘deep’ compromise has affinities with his idea of an ‘overlapping 
consensus’.28 As with a ‘modus vivendi’ a shallow compromise depends on a contingent 
balance of forces between the parties involved, leading them to rub along together. But each 
looks to break the agreement as soon as it is advantageous to do so. Thus, such arrangements 
need not be either particularly equitable or stable. By contrast, a deep compromise involves 
the parties showing a degree of equal concern and respect for each other. They seek to 
acknowledge and accommodate the views of the others. Yet, unlike Rawls’s ‘overlapping 
consensus’, such agreements remain within, and are sustained by, politics. Rawls believed 
that political interaction depended on removing certain basic principles from the sphere of 
political debate as common ground rules.
29
 By contrast, these rules can be seen as the 
continuing focus of ongoing political compromise. For example, Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives disagree about constitutional rights and the electoral system and, as we shall 
see, had to reach a compromise on both in the Coalition agreement. 
The option of a minority government, as described at the start of this article, can be 
built round a shallow compromise. Each party to it can adopt purely instrumental reasoning. 
However, it would be a classic ‘modus vivendi’ and prone to unravel fairly quickly as soon as 
one of the parties believed it electorally advantageous to opt out. To avoid this possibility, the 
Coalition Agreement had as a central plank a commitment by both parties to govern together 
for a full parliamentary term. However, to make that credible, they had to forge a common 
programme of government, for which a deep compromise became necessary. Thus, the 
Coalition Agreement begins by enunciating three shared principles – freedom, fairness and 
responsibility – that provided the common ground for their programme. Yet, as has become 
clear in debates over reform of the National Health Service (NHS), the parties diverge 
considerably in their interpretation of them. However, because each accepted that reference to 
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these principles creates valid reasons for a given policy proposal, it became possible for each 
side to make mutual concessions at the level of policy.
30
 For instance, there is a common 
language of dispersing power away from the centre and upholding the rights of individuals 
against the state. This allowed the parties to adopt the Conservative’s policies of planned cuts 
in public sector spending, welfare to work programmes and other measures that sought to 
reduce state interference and promote market initiatives. However, it also supported the 
Liberal Democrat policies that emphasized local democracy and control, such as improving 
the voice of patients in NHS decisions, and even the pupil premium for disadvantaged 
children, which goes directly to schools rather than via local education authorities and could 
be seen in a similar meritocratic light to Conservative policies for fostering entrepreneurship. 
Analogous overlapping reasoning allowed Conservatives to postpone their preferred tax cut 
of raising the threshold for inheritance tax to prioritize the Liberal Democrats’ favoured 
policy of raising the threshold for income tax. 
Of course, there may be areas that prove not to be amenable to either a shallow or a 
deep compromise. In these cases, the parties will seek to find ways of agreeing to disagree by 
adopting strategies of ‘trimming’ or ‘segregation’. Trimming involves reducing the 
expression of dissent to a level that allows for coexistence. In the Coalition Agreement 
between the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, for example, the strategy of ‘trimming’ 
was adopted for marriage/civil partnership tax breaks, the commissioning of nuclear power 
stations and higher education funding. In these areas, Liberal Democrat MPs can abstain in 
parliamentary votes and speak but not vote against government policy, thereby making it 
possible that these measures will pass while allowing the MPs to voice and maintain their 
opposition to them. The Liberal Democrats also dropped their opposition to replacing the 
Trident missile-based nuclear weapons programme but were allowed to propose alternatives. 
Likewise, segregation seeks to isolate the issue from the rest of the programme, either by 
handing it over to a third party or postponing it altogether. The Coalition government set up 
some 11 ‘independent’ commissions to review various policies, from the possible drafting of 
a British Bill of Rights to the review of public sector pensions, with the aim of providing a 
non-partisan (as opposed to a bi-partisan) view of a potentially contentious policy. The 
Liberal Democrats’ proposal of the alternative vote system was initially a trimming of their 
preference for proportional representation. They had hoped that this move might enable a 
barter or trade-off with the Conservatives in exchange for their proposal to redraw 
constituency boundaries, since both could be justified (albeit on different grounds) as making 
votes fairer.
31
 However, the decision to put it to a referendum operated as a segregating 
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device in handing that decision to the electorate rather than Parliament and allowing MPs of 
each party to campaign on either side. The debt crisis also allowed certain costly and 
potentially divisive policies to be trimmed from the agenda, notably the Liberal Democrat 
pledge to abolish student fees, or segregated and parked until the distant future, such as the 
Conservatives’ promise on stamp duty. These concessions were presented as compromises 
dictated by the economic climate rather than collaboration with another party. and so were 
not really compromises but a matter of facing facts.  
In describing somewhat summarily the character of the compromise that lies behind 
the Coalition Agreement, I do not wish either to criticize or to endorse it, but merely to 
illustrate what political compromise involves. The key feature is that compromise only works 
to the extent that participants feel that the compromise policy relates to principled and other 
moral reasons they hold. Shallow compromises can be non-principled, but for that very 
reason prove elusive. Similarly, trimming and segregation allow participants to avoid 
changing their reasons, but they have to be used sparingly or there would be no common 
programme at all. At some stage, therefore, compromise must go deeper and involve mutual 
changes in the different parties’ reasoning too, so that they can agree on an overlapping 
substantive moral core – albeit one that is itself built around a deep compromise. What I now 
wish to suggest is that such changes require a democratic ethos which can be related in its 
turn to resolving both Wollheim’s paradox in the theory of democracy and the related 
representation paradox. </bi> 
<H1>DEMOCRACY AS COMPROMISE</h1> 
<BNI>The defining circumstances for compromise are the existence of disagreement in 
conditions where a collective agreement is desirable and none of the parties is able to coerce 
the others into accepting their own favoured view. These are also the circumstances of 
democratic politics. Much as any theory of justice must assume conditions of relative 
scarcity, rough equality between the parties involved and conflicting plans of life, without 
which a theory of justice would neither be necessary nor possible,
32
 so a theory of democracy 
assumes disagreement and the need to resolve it in an equitable, uncoerced manner so as to 
reach a collective decision.
33
 We look to a theory of justice to take moderate scarcity as the 
normal human condition and offer an account of how we might divide a pot that will always 
be insufficient to meet all the conflicting demands that are made on it. Wishing that condition 
away removes the need for a theory of justice in the first place. Likewise, we need a theory of 
democratic politics that takes disagreement about justice as a fact of life and offers an 
account of how collective decisions might be legitimately made despite that situation. 
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Moreover, much as justice also requires certain conditions that not only make a just decision 
necessary but possible, so democracy also assumes a certain rough equality between citizens 
so that none can simply impose their view on others, or at least an acceptance that such an 
imposition would be illegitimate. These circumstances not only create the space for 




<BI>Democracy offers a way of taking collective decisions despite our 
disagreements. It does so by recognizing our equal entitlement to hold different views. As 
Wollheim observed, the paradox is only apparent because the view I hold, that A is just, and 
the view that results from the democratic machine, that B is just, respond to two different if 
complementary questions. The second is the answer to ‘what should we do, given that we 
disagree on whether policy A or B is just?’ The first is a response to ‘what do I think is just?’, 
and is my contribution to the disagreement.
35
 Peter Singer has remarked that accepting a 
democratic process to resolve this disagreement is ‘a paradigm of a fair compromise’.36 That 
view needs some qualification. If democracy involves a shared conception of fairness, then 
acceptance of democracy is not itself a matter of compromise. Instead, there is a consensus 
that democracy is a fair way of settling disagreements. At best, it provides a moral side 
constraint on compromise – that when we vote on whether to accept a compromise, say, we 
will adopt a democratic procedure.
37
 However, a more plausible version of Singer’s 
formulation arises if democracy is seen as a mechanism that allows for compromise through 
being a process characterized by mutual respect whereby each seeks to respond to the views 
of others without giving up their own. In submitting to the process, no voter need change 
their views or concede to others. There is an acceptance that all are entitled to disagree and 
that we must reach collective agreements in ways that respect our disagreements. We can 
term this the underlying ethos of democracy.  
Joseph Carens argues that ‘in a democracy people should make concessions to their 
opponents even when the concessions are not needed to create a majority.’38 That goes too 
far. As Simon May has pointed out, the mere fact of moral disagreement need not of itself 
give a moral reason to compromise.
39
 I can hold a reasonable view with which I acknowledge 
others can reasonably disagree, but unless they can offer clear reasons for me altering my 
view – which would not be compromise but moral correction – I have no moral reason to 
seek a mutually satisfactory compromise. For, there can be no reason to regard the 
compromise view as more reasonable than the one I hold – it will be no less subject to 
reasonable disagreement. Nor should I feel morally obliged to compromise for reasons of 
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mutual respect. So long as my view respects democratic norms and the right of others to hold 
different reasonable views to mine, then if a majority favours my position I am entitled to 
make it policy without conceding anything to the minority.
40
 However, that does not mean 
compromise is purely pragmatic, as May contends.  First, as we saw in the last section, when 
circumstances make compromise pragmatically necessary, we have reason to do so in a way 
that is principled. It is not just that principles provide side-constraints on compromise, they 
must form part of the compromise. In such cases, the democratic ethos of respecting 
disagreement involves more than an acceptance of fair and neutral procedures and requires 
reciprocal concessions. Second, there may be no reasonable resolution of conflicting values 
other than one achieved by a process of mutual accommodation. This situation can arise in 
cases of what Nagel calls the ‘fragmentation of value’ in which there are decisive and 
sufficient normative reasons for two or more courses of action between values that are 
incomparable because they stem from irreducibly different bases.
41
 The likelihood of this 
circumstance occurring increases in complex and pluralist societies, where social 
differentiation and ethnic diversity means that citizens bring very different perspectives and 
life experiences to bear on a problem and are apt to weigh it in different ways. Finding room 
for all these values may not be possible, and the only reasonable moral response to this 
practical dilemma may be to appeal to the democratic ethos and seek a compromise under fair 
conditions. This response cannot be regarded as seeking the `best’ balance of views through 
mutual moral correction, because no such `optimal’ position exists – or at least is accessible 
to us given the limits of practical reason. Instead, citizens and politicians morally respond to 
the fact of pluralism through a politics that accords with the democratic ethos. So-called non-
majoritarian electoral systems, that is those systems that use some form of PR rather than 
plurality voting and even institutionalise proportionality in the administrative structures, as 
consociational systems do, effectively institutionalise compromise in this way as a means of 
accommodating pluralism.
42
 In such systems compromise helps construct a collective good 
by bringing all sections of society together. 
Within those pluralist societies that endorse the democratic ethos, therefore, reaching 
collective decisions will almost always involve compromise so as to mitigate disagreement 
sufficiently in order to produce workable, mutually respectful, collective decisions. At the 
very least, a majority will need to be constructed from various coalitions of minorities.
43
  In a 
mass democracy this occurs to a large degree through party leaders devising programmes 
with broad electoral appeal. In favourable circumstances, that can be achieved by a relatively 
shallow compromise. Under conditions where voters’ preferences can be aligned along a 
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single dimension – standardly left–right – party competition should lead to convergence on 
the median voter, which has been shown to be the Condorcet winner.
44
 In other words, the 
most electorally appealing policy package would be the one containing those policies that a 
majority of people would rank most highly had they been able to do so. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that many if any will get their most favoured policies. Instead, they will need to 
compromise and settle for their second or third best. Take the example in Table 1.</bi> 
<Fgn>Table 1</fgn> 
<fig>{Condorcet voting as compromisefig> 
Parties (% of the vote) Policy or candidate 
preference rankings 
Party A (25%) a b c d 
Party B (30%) b a d c 
Party C (40%) c a d b 
Party D (5%) d b c a 
 
<BI>In this example, the plurality winner would be ‘c’, since it is the first preference of the 
most people. However, the Condorcet-winner is ‘a’, since it emerges as the majority 
preference when its ranking is compared against each of the alternatives. As Albert Weale 
has observed, the Condorcet-winner ‘captures the idea of a majority converging around a 
compromise solution where there are divergent ideal preferences’.45  
Increasingly, though, the political divisions of contemporary democracies cannot be 
modelled in this way. As I noted, people’s preferences and hence their principles are multi-
dimensional. New cultural, ethnic, gender and other cleavages have overlaid the old left–right 
divide, while new issues, from global warming to stem-cell research, arise that unsettle 
hitherto dominant dividing lines.
46
 In this situation deeper compromise becomes necessary. 
Politicians cannot treat voters’ preferences as fixed and merely seek to maximize the 
satisfaction of as many as possible. Too many of them prove conflicting and incompatible for 
that to be a plausible strategy for winning a majority. As a result, politicians must attempt to 
appeal to the reasons that lie behind voter preferences and to persuade them in part to modify 
those reasons in the manner explored in the previous section. In the UK, the Conservatives 
have had to struggle to bring together Europhiles and Europhobes, traditionalists and 
libertarians, climate change deniers and rural ecologists, and generally appeal to the middle 
of the electoral spectrum without losing too many from their more radical wings. A similarly 
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eclectic mix can be found in all the main parties. As I noted, such pluralism has often 
motivated moves to PR and a more ‘consensual’ style of democratic politics, in which 
compromise is institutionalised.
47
 In these more proportional electoral systems the multi-
dimensional character of politics is reflected in a multiplicity of parties. Yet, if these parties 
aspire to be partners in a governing coalition, the reasoning behind their policies must be 
roughly congruent with the reasoning of a number of other parties. A workable coalition will 
only arise to the extent deep compromise proves possible. 
In both the shallow and the deep version of a democratic compromise, therefore, 
voters are not just accepting to settle their differences by submitting them to the arbitration of 
a procedure that treats all of them fairly. Unless voters are content to accept permanent 
opposition, they also must be open to a more substantive compromise. Such compromises 
follow from a democratic commitment to each person’s views counting for something. And, 
being views, these imply principles as well as policies. However, such compromises do not 
just occur within the election but also and most crucially post-election, among 
representatives. It is to the relationship of these compromises to the electoral compromises 
that I finally turn.</bi> 
<H1>THE REPRESENTATION PARADOX</h1> 
<BNI>Much of the ire that compromise arouses gets turned against politicians. In 
compromising among themselves they are accused of betraying their electoral mandate. In 
this section, therefore, I shall explore the form of representation needed if the ‘deep’ 
compromises necessary for coalition-building are to keep faith with the commitments 
politicians make to their voters. Three types of representation are routinely distinguished in 
the literature: representation as delegates, where the representatives are instructed what to do; 
representation as trustees, where representatives decide what to do; and representation as 
copies, where representatives replicate what to do.
48
 In practice, representatives no doubt find 
themselves adopting elements of all three. However, I want to suggest that deep compromise 
among representatives operates most democratically to the extent that it corresponds to a 
variant of the third type of representation.</bni> 
<BI>Delegatory forms of representation seem to have the most straightforwardly 
democratic credentials. On this view, politicians get elected to pursue a certain programme 
and then are honour bound to act under the instructions of the electorate and stick to their 
campaign pledges. However, this position appears to brook almost no compromise. Arguably, 
though, it allows for shallow compromises. True, specific policy pledges, such as George 
Bush’s ‘read my lips, no new taxes’ or the Liberal Democrats’ promise not to raise student 
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fees, can only be modified or abandoned at the cost of appearing to betray the electorate. Yet, 
for that very reason, they tend to be rare – politicians know that unforeseen events make such 
promises rash. Instead, election campaigns tend to involve politicians putting forward rather 
vaguer policies linked to a certain ideological perspective. For example, both Liberal 
Democrats and Conservatives committed themselves to rolling back the alleged erosion of 
civil liberties under Labour in ways that they linked to their distinctive views of freedom, but 
without going into too many specifics. If we see legislators as delegates with regard to these 
general ends, then compromise might be possible with regard to means and to achieve the 
maximal satisfaction of these ends. This proposal has been made by Thomas Christiano. He 
argues that full-time professional politicians may reasonably claim greater expertise than 
ordinary citizens with regard to means, but should act under their instructions as to ends. As a 
result, they should be ‘limited to deliberating about means and bargaining with other 
legislators . . . to achieve the best possible compromise among citizen’s announced schedules 
of trade-offs’.49 However, this solution rules out deep compromises. Therefore, to the extent 
we have seen these to be necessary; a different form of representation seems called for. 
A standard assumption has been that, for representatives to be able to negotiate 
compromises about ‘ends’, they must act as ‘trustees’. This is the position commonly 
ascribed to Edmund Burke. In his famous ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol’, Burke explicitly 
disavowed the view that the electorate issued ‘authoritative instructions’ to their 
representatives.
50
 For the representatives to be bound to represent the partial interests of their 
constituents, he argued, would be inconsistent with their role within Parliament as 
deliberators on the national interest. To do that, representatives had to be free to exercise their 
own judgement as to what was the best way both to pursue the interests of the Bristol voters, 
and to relate them to the interests of the country as a whole. That view clearly goes beyond 
deliberation about means to encompass the discussion of ends. Yet, it comes at a price. To be 
consistent with democracy, Burke’s position must assume that politicians are selected for 
their good judgement rather than to represent the judgement of their constituents – a 
judgement that extends not just to the means whereby their interests might be best realized 
but also to whether those interests serve the best ends. If so, it then becomes mysterious how 
electors could be competent to choose their representatives and hold them to account. It also 
overlooks the degree to which campaigns do rest on reasoning among the electorate and with 
politicians. Indeed, it is precisely the claim to be a trustee in this Burkean sense that leads 
voters to distrust politicians and reject their compromises as illegitimate. They regard these 
compromises as attempts by politicians to substitute their reasoning for the reason of those 
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who they ought to serve. Though politicians may claim to act for the public interest, if the 
public’s express views on their interests are being disregarded in the process, the suspicion 
always will be that they are simply serving their own. 
Representation as replication is usually associated with forms of ‘mirror’ 
representation, often linked to a politics of presence that will allow the representative body to 
be ‘an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large’, able to ‘think, feel, reason, and act 
like them’.51 This aspiration has generally been thought impossible to fulfil in all respects. 
The archetypal ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘male’ and so on proves a chimera. Yet, this 
aim also lies at the heart of the paradox raised by the very concept of representation, which 
seeks to make present what is not present.
52
 Certain theorists have recently adapted this 
argument and given it a more limited and plausible application as the representation of 
citizen’s political views as these emerge through the electoral process.53 As with Christiano’s 
account of delegation cited above, it is accepted that, as professionals, representatives have 
the advantage over most voters in having the time to become better informed about the issues 
than most of them can be. The election is rather an attempt by politicians to show how their 
various policy proposals relate to the views of citizens. For, pace Burke, voters participate in 
elections not to push their interests per se, but to express their views.
54
 After all, as a different 
voter paradox has it, to vote simply to achieve a given policy would be irrational; the 
likelihood of your vote counting sufficiently to be worth going to the polls is too remote.
55
 So 
the appeal of representatives lies in their thinking like their voters – in their being like-
minded in their reasoning.
56
  
Representation conceived in this way does not require that one represents how 
everyone in a polity thinks about every single issue. Nor does it involve duplicating how they 
reason in all spheres of life. Rather, it involves seeking to represent the main modes of 
thinking about political issues – those with significant support – in ways that are roughly 
proportionate to their distribution among the populace. As far as that is the case, it will be 
legitimate for representatives to legislate in ways that continue the process of deep 
compromise that forms a necessary part of any successful election campaign. That is, they 
can reason on politics ‘as’ their voters, not just about means but also about the ends that they 
share with them, applying this reasoning in collaboration with other representatives so as to 
reach collective agreements on how to tackle the policy issues of the day. Indeed, the 
diversity of views found in most pluralist societies is likely to make such compromise 
necessary.  
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Which electoral system might best achieve this result lies outside the scope of this 
article. However, as the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition testifies, even a plurality 
system can produce sufficient diversity to make compromise necessary. The argument here is 
that, in evaluating the democratic credentials of such compromises, it is not the policies per 
se that ought properly to be our focus – or that of the parties concerned when making 
compromises – but rather their reasoning on these policies. To the extent that this is plausibly 
representative of the reasoning of their supporters, that in the case of the Coalition Agreement 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats reasoned as one would expect of such parties – 
themselves a broad church – then their joint decisions can be said to support rather than 
undermine democracy. Such compromises can be regarded as democratically authorized and 
accountable as well as consistent with the democratic ethos, for they offer a realistic way in 
which citizens can be taken seriously as reasoning agents about public policy, and their views 
be accorded equal concern and respect in the on-going policy-making process.</bi> 
<H1>CONCLUSION</h1> 
<BNI>This article has addressed the question of whether democratic politicians can 
compromise with each other without compromising themselves, democracy or their 
supporters. In the first section I suggested that cannot be by making shallow compromises 
that avoid issues of principle. Such compromises would indeed prove unprincipled in every 
sense. Political compromises cannot avoid reasoning on ends as well as means. Yet, such 
deep compromises need not just to involve principles but also to be principled, showing 
mutual respect for the views of others. The second section then argued that such deep 
compromises reflect the ethos of democracy. Acceptance of a democratic process will appear 
paradoxical to those unprepared to countenance any compromise. However, the paradox can 
be resolved for democrats prepared to see both the procedures and outcomes of democracy as 
involving a fair compromise, in which we take seriously the entitlement of all citizens to a 
say in matters of collective concern. Finally, I explored how far politicians can avoid the 
representation paradox and enter into compromises with each other without betraying their 
electoral commitments. The answer lies in grasping the paradoxical character of 
representation itself and conceiving representatives as making present the reasoning of those 
who are not present, whose views to some extent they must share. This need not involve a 
politics of presence or mirror representation, for it involves the representation of political 
ideas not of persons, as these are forged and expressed within the electoral process.<bni> 
<BI>None of the above is to deny that there may be matters that cannot be 
compromised. The more the cleavages within a political community are segmental and 
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vertical, rather than cross-cutting and horizontal, the shallower compromise tends to become, 
and the greater the resort to trimming and segregation. Communities that are deeply divided 
on ethnic, cultural or religious lines tend to end up adopting ever more ‘special rights’ to trim 
issues off the agenda, and to demand the segregation of ever more decisions into autonomous 
decision-making bodies, such as regional assemblies or regulative authorities. 
57
 However, 
the more such devices are employed, the less the citizens involved can be said to form a 
democratic community – and in extreme cases may even split up, as indeed Scottish and 
Welsh nationalists, for example, desire. That possibility merely reinforces my central point –
to accept democracy is to accept compromise. When the divisions within a political 
community are such that various groups can no longer compromise with each other then it is 
likely that they must either separate into distinct demoi or give up on democracy altogether. 
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